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 In June a splintered Supreme Court held in McDonald v. 
City of Chicago that the Second Amendment applied to state 
and local governments.  But the case was about much more 
than handguns.  It presented the Court with an unprecedented 
opportunity to correct its own erroneous precedent and revive 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause.  
The plurality declined the offer not, as Justice Alito’s opinion 
suggested, out of a profound respect for stare decisis, but 
rather because at least four Justices like the consequences of 
that ancient error, especially insofar as unenumerated rights 
are concerned.  This observation in turn raises questions about 





 Justice Scalia is fond of saying that he is an originalist, not 
“a nut.”1  If so, the Court’s June decision in McDonald v. City of 
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Constitution (National Public Radio broadcast Apr. 28, 2008), available at 
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Chicago2 makes the case for a more robust insanity.  McDonald 
gave the Court a singular opportunity to rectify a century-old 
jurisprudential perversion, the profound consequences of which 
continue to shape our constitutional culture.  Justice Scalia (and the 
plurality of Justices he joined) declined that opportunity, not 
because, as they protested, modesty forbade it.  They did so 
because they rather like the consequences of that perversion. 
 In support of that confrontational claim, this essay briefly 
reviews the Court’s McDonald decision, underscoring the fork in 
the road it presented.  Part II then explains why Justice Scalia and 
his colleagues in the plurality were anything but disinterested in 
this far-more-than-academic choice.  Specifically, although the 
election among paths is of little or no consequence for gun rights, 
the immediate issue before the Court, it is of enormous importance 
for the full range of issues addressed by the Court’s modern 
unenumerated rights jurisprudence, which governs everything from 
parental rights and academic freedom to reproductive rights and 
sexual autonomy.  In Part III, this essay explores the likely 
significance of this recent chicanery for future unenumerated rights 
decisions and for the integrity of the Court’s interpretative 
enterprise. 
 
I. A CASE (NOT REALLY) ABOUT GUNS 
 
 On its face, McDonald was a case about handguns, 
specifically Chicago’s regulation effectively banning them.3  Two 
years ago in District of Columbia v. Heller4 the Court had 
invalidated D.C.’s similar law, and the issue before the Court in 
McDonald was whether that rule of decision extended beyond the 
federal enclave to circumscribe the powers of state and local 
governments throughout the nation.  Taking Heller as a given, the 
question might have been non-controversial.  The reasoning of the 
                                                 
2 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
3 Id. at 3025.  See also Chicago, Ill., Municipal Code § 8-20-040(a) (2009). 
4 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
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Court’s modern case law finding specific Bill of Rights provisions 
to be incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment fairly clearly 
extended to the kind of individual right Heller had recognized.5  
Yet the Court split five to four on the issue, with the five Justices 
in the Heller majority voting to extend it over the opposition of 
three of the Heller dissenters, joined by their newest colleague, 
Justice Sotomayor.6 
 None of this surprised anyone, the only suspense 
McDonald generated concerning which part of the Fourteenth 
Amendment would be found to encompass the substance of the 
Second.  In an opinion for four Justices, Justice Alito decided the 
case on the basis of the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition on 
state deprivations of a person’s life, liberty, or property without 
                                                 
5 See McDonald, 130 S.Ct. at 3036-42.  To be sure, the lower federal courts 
found themselves on the horns of a dilemma.  On the one hand, the rationale of 
Heller pointed towards application of the Second Amendment to the states.  On 
the other hand, however, the Supreme Court has commanded that when one of 
its rulings “has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons 
rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the 
case which directly controls, leaving to [the Supreme] Court the prerogative of 
overruling its own decisions.” Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American 
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989).  Discerning when an ancient precedent 
has “direct application” to a current case is more of an art than a science.  
Compare National Rifle Ass’n of America, Inc. v. Chicago, 567 F.3d 856, 858 
(2009) (incorporation question controlled by Reconstruction-Era cases), with 
Nordyke v. King, 563 F.3d 439, 448-49 (2009) (Reconstruction-Era cases did 
not foreclose consideration of the selective incorporation issue). 
6 The dissents might best be understood as reflecting their authors’ continuing 
non-acquiescense in Heller itself, see e.g., McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3122 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (chastising the Court for decling to reconsider Heller in 
light of intervening scholarly criticism), despite the dissenters’ occasional 
protestations that they took “Heller  as a given.”  Id.  For a counting of the 
individual Justices’ votes that produces a surprising result, see David S. Cohen, 
The Paradox of McDonald v. City of Chicago, __ Geo. Wash. L. Rev. __ 
(forthcoming 2010), available at http://www.ssrn.com/link/Drexel-U-LEG.html 
(concluding that “separate and overlapping majorities of the Court found, 
paradoxically, that the Second Amendment was incorporated against state and 
local governments but also that neither the Due Process Clause nor the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause incorporated the right”).  
 4
“due process of law.”7  As Justice Thomas observed in his separate 
opinion concurring in the result, this provision might have seemed 
an unpromising one, given that it apparently spoke in terms of 
minimal procedures rather than substantive rights of any sort.8  But 
as Justice Alito had painstakingly explained, for more than a 
century the Court had persisted in just such an apparent misreading 
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s text.9  For him and his colleagues 
in the plurality, the instant case provided no occasion for 
correction of that error, if error there was.10 
Were nothing more at stake, it might be hard to argue with 
such a Burkean prudence.11  But for the reasons developed below 
in Part II, that ancient error (and error there most certainly had 
been) had long distorted discussion about the Constitution’s 
protection of individual rights.  Before the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s guarantee of due process, section 1 forbade states 
from making or enforcing “any law abridging the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States.”12  No other clause of 
the Constitution apparently promised so much only to be 
authoritatively construed to mean so little.13  In The Slaughter-
House Cases,14 decided a mere five years after the Fourteenth 
Amendment was ratified, a bare majority of the Justices badly 
butchered the Privileges or Immunities Clause, reducing it to an 
absurdly narrow and historically irrelevant compass.  Legal 
academics dispute nearly everything, yet there is virtual unanimity 
that the Court misconstrued the Privileges or Immunities Clause in 
The Slaughter-House Cases15 (though, of course, there is nothing 
                                                 
7 U.S. Const. am. 14, § 1; see McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3030 (plurality opinion).   
8 Id. at 3059 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
9 Id. at 3030-31 (plurality opinion). 
10 Id. 
11 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353 
(2006) (describing tension between a Burkean deference to tradition and an 
originalist approach to constitutional interpretation). 
12 U.S. Const. am. 14, § 1. 
13 See generally 130 S. Ct. at 3060-3061. 
14 83 U.S. 36 (1873).  
15 130 S. Ct. 3030. 
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approaching consensus as to what the correct construction of that 
clause might be).16 
As Justice Scalia observed in his opinion for the Court in 
Heller, the Second Amendment is something of a final frontier for 
constitutional interpretation.  More than two centuries old, the 
Second Amendment was there treated rather like a blank slate, free 
from any distorting judicial gloss accumulated in the intervening 
centuries.17  Applying a priori principles to decode the 
constitutional text, Heller held that “the Second Amendment 
protects the right to keep and bear arms for the purpose of self-
defense.”18  Hence, McDonald’s challenge, filed in the immediate 
wake of Heller,19 to Chicago’s handgun ordinance for the first time 
squarely brought to the Court the one-hundred-forty-year-old 
question: did the Fourteenth Amendment make the Second 
Amendment a limit on the states as well as the federal 
government?  If ever there would be occasion for the contemporary 
Court to correct its Slaughter-House slip, McDonald seemed to 
provide it. 
Justice Alito, at this point writing for five Justices, came 
close to conceding as much.  He engaged in an unusually extensive 
discussion of the manner in which petitioners’ had presented their 
alternative legal arguments against the Chicago ordinance, 
describing their claim that the right to keep and bear arms was 
among the “privileges or immunities of U.S. citizens” as their 
“primary submission.”20  Their contention that the right ought to be 
incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and thereby made applicable to state and local 
governments was “a secondary argument.”21  He then launched 
                                                 
16 Id. 
17 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2815-2816; but see id. at 2822-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(insisting that precedent foreclosed the majority’s interpretation of the Second 
Amendment).  
18 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3026 (plurality opinion). 
19 Id. at 3027. 
20 Id. at 3028-3031. 
21 Id. at 3028.  
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into a five-page discussion on the sad history of U.S. citizens’ 
privileges and immunities, acknowledging that legal scholars have 
been uncharacteristically in accord in their condemnation of “the 
narrow Slaughter-House interpretation” of that clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.22  He even added that the Court’s 1876 
Cruikshank decision holding that the right to keep and bear arms 
was not a privilege or immunity within the meaning of that 
provision was itself the product of the Court’s ignominious 
abandonment of Reconstruction, arising as it did in the context of 
the Court’s award of amnesty to perpetrators of the “infamous 
Colfax Massacre in Louisiana on Easter Sunday 1873.”23  Had 
Justice Alito set out to lay the foundation for overruling 
Cruikshank and embarking on the privileges or immunities path, it 
is difficult to imagine what more he might have done. 
But it was all wind up and no pitch.  For on the following 
page, now writing for a plurality of four Justices, Alito tersely 
dismissed the argument with the imperious declaration that “[w]e 
see no need to reconsider [the Slaughter-House Cases’] 
interpretation here.”24  There was, he found, no impediment to a 
due process decision.  The Cruikshank Court had not expressly 
addressed a due process claim, no doubt because the litigants had 
not surprisingly failed to anticipate that the Court would read the 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment apparently protecting rights 
to be a nullity and then go on to read a clause evidently about 
procedures to be a font for substantive rights.25  Having turned a 
                                                 
22 Id. at 3029.  
23 Id. at 3030; see also id. (noting that “[d]ozens of blacks, many unarmed, were 
slaughtered by a rival band of armed white men” and that the lead defendant in 
the case had “himself marched unarmed African-American prisoners through the 
streets and then had them summarily executed”), citing C. LANE, THE DAY 
FREEDOM DIED 265-66 (2008). 
24 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3030.  See generally Nelson Lund,  Two Faces of 
Judicial Restraint (or are There More?) in McDonald v. City of Chicago 11, 
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract_id=1658198 (last visited Aug. 22, 2010) 
(concluding that Alito’s opinion reflected “a very strong, if implicit, position 
that judicial restraint consists primarily in fidelity to precedent”). 
25 Id. at 3031. 
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blind eye to the kind of intellectual jujitsu inherent in this history, 
Justice Alito proceeded to first describe26 and then apply the 
standard for “selective incorporation” as it ultimately emerged in 
the Court’s 1968 ruling in Duncan v. Louisiana.27  The only 
surprising aspect of this analysis was that it was not unanimous 
among the eight Justices who found it to be more or less the proper 
inquiry.  But these eight were unanimous as to one, critical 
decision -- to leave the Privileges or Immunities Clause in the 
same moribund condition in which they found it. 
Justice Scalia devoted two sentences of his fifteen-page 
concurring opinion to explaining why he joined Justice Alito’s 
analysis despite his “misgivings about Substantive Due Process as 
an original matter.”28  Citing his own opinion in Albright v. 
Oliver,29 where he had first formally “acquiesced in the Court’s 
incorporation of certain guarantees in the Bill of Rights,” he 
reiterated that he did so because the practice was “‘both long 
established and narrowly limited.’”30  As such his assent to 
incorporation was more a pragmatic than a principled one, the 
concession of a moderate statesmen submitting to the errors of his 
predecessors.  In short, the kind of temperate compromise expected 
of anyone “not a nut.” 
Scalia had in effect broadcast this position when, at oral 
argument, he derisively dismissed the petitioners’ Privileges or 
Immunities Clause argument as “that darling of the 
professoriate.”31  In so exempting a cornerstone of modern 
constitutional jurisprudence from the dictates of his oft professed 
dedication to originalism, however, he disregarded his own 
trenchant observation that the “notion that the absence of a 
                                                 
26 Id. at 3034. 
27 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
28 130 S. Ct. at 3050 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
29 510 U.S. 266 (1994). 
30 130 S. Ct. at 3050 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Albright, 510 U.S. at 275 
(Scalia, J., concurring). 
31 McDonald v. City of Chicago, Transcript no. 08-1521, pg. 7, line 9 (argued 
March 2, 2010). 
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coherent theory [of constitutional interpretation] will somehow 
curtail judicial caprice is at war with reason.”32  Even if the instant 
case did not “require [him] to reconsider [the] view” he had 
expressed in Albright,33 it certainly permitted and invited him to do 
so, as the example of Justice Thomas illustrates.34  After all, Justice 
Scalia has made it clear that he does not “believe in rigid 
adherence to stare decisis  in constitutional cases.”35  So why did 
he meekly refrain from going where his originalist method would 
have taken him?  Why the sudden modesty?            
  
II. WHAT A DIFFERENCE A CLAUSE CAN MAKE 
 
 The Court’s most controversial decisions have, almost 
without exception, concerned claims of unenumerated rights.  This 
should come as no surprise.  As Justice White noted, the “Court is 
most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals 
with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable 
roots in the language or design of the Constitution.”36  That the 
case in which he made this observation has itself been overruled 
only underscores the vitality and intensity of that debate.  In the 
early twentieth century, the great constitutional clashes centered 
around the rise and fall of liberty of contract, a notion the Court, 
for a time, found implicit in the Due Process Clause.37  In the latter 
half of the century and into this one, the most volatile of 
                                                 
32 130 S. Ct. at 3052 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). 
33 Id. at 3050 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
34 Id. at 3058-3059 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (analyzing the case 
under the Privileges or Immunities Clause). 
35 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 587 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Nor is 
Justice Scalia alone in his stare-decisis agnosticism.  See generally Geoffrey R. 
Stone, The Roberts Court, Stare Decisis, and the Future of Constitutional Law, 
82 TUL. L. REV. 1533, 1537 (2008) (asserting that in the 2006 Term, “[i]n case 
after case, Roberts and Alito abandoned the principle of stare decisis.”). 
36 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 
U.S. 558.   
37 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905); see also West Coast Hotel 
Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937).  
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constitutional questions have concerned reproductive freedom38 
and sexual autonomy.39  After an initial hesitancy40 and 
experimentation with alternative avenues,41 the modern Court, like 
its Lochner Era predecessors, rooted these rights in the due process 
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.42  The concept if 
not all of its manifestations at some point apparently entered the 
constitutional canon.  Judge Bork doomed his 1987 nomination to 
the Supreme Court when he proclaimed that he could find no right 
to privacy in the Constitution.43 
 Nonetheless, Justice Scalia has ordered his constitutional 
jurisprudence in opposition to the Court’s modern unenumerated-
rights rulings.  If a Justice can ever claim a mandate, he could 
fairly claim this to be his.  He was nominated to serve on the Court 
by a President twice elected on a platform that renounced Roe v. 
                                                 
38 See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern PA. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 
410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
39 See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overruling Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)). 
40 See generally Griswold, 381 U.S. 479.  See also Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Substantive Due Process, 17 TOURO L. REV. 1501, 1506 (1999) (“The best 
illustration of the avoidance of substantive due process is Justice Douglas’s 
majority opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut.”).  
41 See generally Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316  U.S. 535 (1942). 
42 See Chemerinsky, supra note 40, at 1507 (Roe “was unquestionably a 
substantive due process case.”). 
43 See Thomas B. McAffee, The Role of Legal Scholars in Confirmation 
Hearings for Supreme Court Nominees -- Some Reflections, 7 ST. JOHN’S J. 
LEGAL COMMENT. 211, 214 (1991) (“According to his scholarly and senatorial 
opponents, Judge Bork’s steadfast opposition to the legitimacy of judicial 
elaboration of unenumerated constitutional rights was a sufficient ground to 
reject his nomination. This single issue became the linchpin in the argument that 
he was a constitutional extremist.”).  See also Sanford Levinson, Constitutional 
Rhetoric and the Ninth Amendment, 64 CHI. KENT L. REV. 131, 135 (1988) 
(“Judge Bork was deprived of a seat on the Supreme Court largely because of 
his refusal to acknowledge the ‘unenumerated’ right to privacy as being part of 
the set of constitutional rights legitimately enjoyed by Americans.”).  
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Wade as an illegitimate judicial usurpation44 and was confirmed 
the year before the Bork nomination became a senatorial 
referendum on originalism, after which the three Justices 
nominated by a Republican have had to pretend indecision as to 
the constitutional status of abortion.45 
 In any event, Scalia has faithfully pursued his anti-
unenumerated-rights agenda.  In the almost twenty-five years he 
has been a Justice, the Court has considered or reconsidered claims 
that the Constitution implicitly protected an individual right to 
refuse life-sustaining medical treatment,46 have access to one’s 
biological children,47 deny others access to one’s children,48 
engage in adult, consensual homosexual sex,49 as well as terminate 
a pregnancy50 including via a specifically banned procedure.51  
Petitions for certiorari have during this same period begged in vain 
for the Court to decide whether the Constitution implicitly 
guaranteed a right to be free of blatantly protectionist economic 
regulation,52 to access potentially life-sustaining pharmaceuticals 
pending FDA approval,53 and to distribute both sexual stimulation 
devices54 and hard-core pornography.55  Justice Scalia’s 
                                                 
44 See H.W. Perry, Jr. & L.A. Powe, Jr., The Political Battle for the Constitution, 
21 CONST. COMMENT. 641, 672 (2004).  
45 See Robert J. Pushaw, Partial-Birth Abortion and the Perils of Constitutional 
Common Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 519, 588 (2008). 
46 See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
47 See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
48 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 91-92 (2000). 
49 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  
50 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern PA. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); 
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
51 See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 929 (2000); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 
U.S. 124 (2007). 
52 Compare Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 229 (2002) (invalidating funeral 
director’s licensing requirement as a “naked attempt to raise a fortress protecting 
the monopoly rents that funeral directors extract from consumers”), with Brown 
v. Hovatter, 561 F.3d 357, 369 (4th Cir. 2009) (upholding a similar licensing 
requirement). 
53 See Abigail Alliance v. Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
54 See Williams v. Pryor, 240 F.3d 944 (11th Cir. 2001). 
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unwavering response to such claims when they have reached the 
Court has been to reject them, often in dissent from his colleagues’ 
contrary views.56 
 Moreover, Justice Scalia has consistently sought to recast 
the discussion so as to sharply circumscribe the Court’s capacity to 
enlarge the list of “fundamental rights” meriting meaningful 
substantive protection under the Due Process Clause.  In his 
plurality opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D., Scalia declared that  
 
[i]n an attempt to limit and guide interpretation of 
the Clause, we have insisted not merely that the 
interest denominated as a ‘liberty’ be ‘fundamental’ 
(a concept that, in isolation, is hard to objectify), but 
also that it be an interest traditionally protected by 
our society.57 
 
Nor did he stop there.  In a portion of his opinion in which only the 
Chief Justice joined, Scalia added that, when searching for 
evidence of our traditions, the Court “refer[s] to the most specific 
level [of generality] at which a relevant tradition protecting, or 
denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified.”58  
Whatever the merits of this methodology,59 it is apparent that 
                                                                                                             
55 See United States v. Extreme Associates, Inc., 552 F.Supp.2d 578 (W.D. Pa. 
2005) (dismissing prosecution brought under federal obscenity statutes as 
contravening  individuals’ substantive due process rights to possess and view 
obscene material in the home), rev’d, 431 F.3d 150 (3d. Cir. 2005). 
56 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 587 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 91-92 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern PA. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 979 (1992) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting); cf. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 
261, 292 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
57 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). 
58 Id. at 127 n.6. 
59 Compare Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the 
Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1090 (1990) (criticizing Scalia’s 
proposed methodology), with Gregory C. Cook, Footnote 6: Justice Scalia’s 
Attempt to Impose a Rule of Law on Substantive Due Process, 14 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 853 (1991) (defending same). 
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Scalia asserted (and repeatedly reasserted) it as a tool to cabin 
judicial identification of unenumerated rights out of a hostility to 
them.    
 The analytical linchpin of Justice Scalia’s assault on the 
modern unenumerated rights cases is that the very term 
“substantive due process” is itself an oxymoron.60  Indeed, the due 
process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments promise 
process before life, liberty, or property can be taken away.  So long 
as procedural requisites are satisfied, it would seem that the state 
can, insofar as due process is concerned, deprive the individual of 
her liberty, her property, and even her life.  A fortiori, so the 
argument goes, with sufficient procedures (such as those necessary 
to enact a statute) the state can take an individual’s “right” to 
refuse life-sustaining medical treatment61 or terminate a 
pregnancy62 or do any of the other things the Court’s substantive 
due process cases have deemed sacrosanct.  In so arguing, Scalia 
follows the example, and draws upon the prestige and authority, of 
a politically diverse array of distinguished jurists63 and 
                                                 
60 See, e.g., United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 39 (1994) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“If I thought that ‘substantive due process’ were a constitutional 
right rather than an oxymoron, I would think it violated by bait-and-switch 
taxation.”).   See also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 592 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“there 
is no right to ‘liberty’ under the Due Process Clause . . . .  The Fourteenth 
Amendment expressly allows States to deprive their citizens of ‘liberty,’ so long 
as ‘due process of law’ is provided.”) (emphasis in original); Albright, 510 U.S. 
at 275 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I reject the proposition that the Due Process 
Clause guarantees certain (unspecified) liberties, rather than merely guarantees 
certain procedures as a prerequisite to deprivation of liberty.”); TXO Production 
Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 470-471 (1993) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (same). 
61 See Cruzan¸ 497 U.S. 261. 
62 See Casey, 505 U.S. 833; Roe, 410 U.S. 113.   On this view, the Due Process 
Clause would entitle someone prosecuted under the Texas abortion statute, for 
example, to a trial before conviction and punishment, but does not confer 
immunity from prosecution altogether, as did the Court’s decision  in Roe. 
63  See, e.g. West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) (Hughes, 
C.J.) (“[T]he violation alleged by those attacking minimum wage regulation for 
women is deprivation of freedom of contract. What is this freedom? The 
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commentators.64  Moreover, this argument’s emphasis on the text 
of the Due Process Clause (in contradistinction to, for example, 
inquiry into the intent of its drafters65 or such historical antecedents 
of the clause as the Magna Carta66) accords with Scalia’s 
                                                                                                             
Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract. It speaks of liberty and 
prohibits the deprivation of liberty without due process of law. . . .  and 
regulation which is reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the 
interests of the community is due process.”); Ellis v. Hamilton, 669 F.2d 510, 
512 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.) (discussing “the ubiquitous oxymoron 
‘substantive due process’”); United States v. Fitzgerald, 724 F.2d 633, 639 (8th 
Cir. 1983) (en banc) (Arnold, J., concurring) (noting substantive due process is 
“an oxymoron if ever there was one”).  See also Gosnell v. City of Troy, 59 F.3d 
654, 657 (7th Cir. 1995) (asserting that substantive  due  process is an oxymoron 
and procedural due process is a redundancy); Newell v. Brown, 981 F.2d 880, 
885 (6th Cir. 1992) (noting substantive  due  process is a “durable oxymoron”).  
See generally Philip A. Talmadge, The Myth of Property Absolutism and 
Modern Government: The Interaction of Police Power and Property Rights, 75 
WASH. L. REV. 857, 894 n.195 (2000) (citing cases). 
64 See, e.g., CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN 
RIGHTS, NAMED AND UNNAMED 3 (1997); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF 
AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 31 (1990) (labeling 
substantive due process a “momentous sham”); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY 
AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 18 (1980) (describing 
substantive due process  as “a contradiction in terms-- sort of like ‘green pastel 
redness’”); Akhil Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. 
L. REV. 26, 122-23 (2000). 
65 See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Originalist Defense of Substantive Due 
Process: Magna Carta, Higher-Law Constitutionalism, and the Fifth 
Amendment, 58 EMORY L.J. 585 (2009) (arguing that at the time the Fifth 
Amendment was adopted one widely shared interpretation of the Due Process 
Clause was that it protected unenumerated substantive rights).  
66 Id.  These inquiries are not necessarily inconsistent with a textualist approach 
to constitutional interpretation.  See id. at 588-89 (distinguishing between 
“original-meaning originalism,” which focuses on how the constitutional text 
would have been understood by the relevant community at the time of its 
adoption, and “intentional meaning originalism,” which focuses on the intent of 
a provision’s drafters).  But to conform to textualism interpretations drawn from 
inquiries into original meaning must confront and surmount the fact that “[b]y 
their terms, the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
appear to protect only rights to legal process.”  Id. at 589. 
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“textualist” methodology for both statutory and constitutional 
interpretation.67    
 Of course the paradox of looking to an apparently 
procedural guarantee for the protection of substantive rights 
vanishes once one shifts the focus from the Due Process to the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause.  The language of that clause is 
perfectly consistent with, indeed arguably invites, a reading that 
accords it substantive significance.  To be sure, a great deal of 
work remains to be done to get from even that text to the Court’s 
unenumerated rights rulings, either historical68 or contemporary,69 
and it is far from clear how such inquiries either would or ought to 
be resolved.  But at least such efforts would be directed to the right 
part of the Constitution, and the debate would be freed from the 
sophistries occluding understanding that have long been prevalent 
in the substantive due process conversation – including the 
incorporation debate. 
 In addition to the claim that the very concept of substantive 
due process is oxymoronic, the location of substantive rights in the 
Due Process Clause presents other serious interpretative anomalies.  
For example, the assertion that such Bill of Rights protections as 
the prohibitions on double jeopardy and compulsory self-
incrimination are made applicable to the states via the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment encounters the difficulty that 
the Fifth Amendment distinctly enumerates all three rights 
guarantees.  As Justice Frankfurter observed in his opposition to 
Justice Black’s “total incorporation” theory, “[i]t ought not to 
                                                 
67 See generally ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE LAW  9-20 (Amy Guttman, ed., 1997).  See also Heller, 128 S. 
Ct. at 2788 (“In interpreting this text, we are guided by the principle that the 
Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases 
were used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning. 
Normal meaning may of course include an idiomatic meaning, but it excludes 
secret or technical meanings that would not have been known to ordinary 
citizens in the founding generation.”) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
68 See supra note 37. 
69 See supra notes 38 - 51 and accompanying text. 
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require argument to reject the notion that due process of law meant 
one thing in the Fifth Amendment and another in the 
Fourteenth.”70  But that interpretative anomaly would be 
inescapable, absent attribution of an astounding redundancy to the 
draftsmanship of James Madison, an equally grave hermeneutical 
sin.71  As with the “oxymoron” label, this Hobson’s choice is 
avoided if the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities 
Clause replaces the Due Process Clause as the font of 
incorporation.72  This shift would dispense with any need to read 
due process to mean different things when found in different parts 
of the Constitution.  In short, the Due Process Clause is an 
exceedingly awkward textual basis for the protection of both 
enumerated and unenumerated substantive rights.73 
                                                 
70 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 66 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
71 Id.  Frankfurter also dismissed as self-evidently erroneous “a  construction 
which gives to due process no independent function but turns it into a summary 
of the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights.”  Id. at 67.  He observed that 
“[t]he short answer to the suggestion that the provision of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which ordains 'nor shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law,' was a way of saying that every 
State must thereafter initiate prosecutions through indictment by a grand jury, 
must have a trial by a jury of 12 in criminal cases, and must have trial by such a 
jury in common law suits where the amount in controversy exceeds $20, is that 
it is a strange way of saying it.”  Id. at 63.   Identification of at least some of 
these rights as the privileges or immunities of U.S. citizens is, however, far less 
jarring.    
72 On the significance of the parallel between the “privileges and immunities” 
clause of Article IV, section 2, and the “privileges or immunities” clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, see infra notes 75 - 77 and accompanying text. 
73 Justice Black tacitly acknowledged as much when, in his Adamson dissent, he 
referred repeatedly to “section 1” of the Fourteenth Amendment, leaving it 
somewhat ambiguous as to which part of that section he was invoking.  See, e.g., 
Adamson, 332 U.S. at 71-72 (Black, J., dissenting) (asserting that “one of the 
chief objects that the provisions of the Amendment's first section, separately, 
and as a whole, were intended to accomplish was to make the Bill of Rights, 
applicable to the states”); see also id. at 124 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (“I agree 
that the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights should be carried over intact 
into the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
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 In addition to avoiding the wrong questions, a focus on the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause would permit sustained judicial 
consideration of the right ones.74  The scope of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s protection would be reconnected to the parallel 
provision in Article IV, section 2,75 and to Justice Washington’s 
celebrated antebellum disquisition on the same,76 which was 
forefront in the minds of many of the Amendment’s framers.77  A 
great deal of scholarly ink has already been, and continues to be, 
spilt on these matters,78 but a judicial resurrection of the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause would provide an avenue for reception of 
these debates into the U.S. reports.  Wherever these conversations 
might ultimately lead, one can imagine why Justice Scalia would 
prefer they never occur.  They could only complicate and weaken 
his case against the modern case law he so detests.     
                                                 
74 See Christopher R. Green, The Original Sense of “Of” in the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause 7 (Aug. 12, 2010), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1658010 
(observing that “refocusing the textual inquiry on the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause would allow proper framing of the historical questions related to the 
Fourteenth Amendment”).  
75 U.S. Const., art. IV, § 2. 
76 Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823). 
77 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765-66 (1866) (statement of 
Sen. Howard); see also John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1416-20 (1992) (discussing possible 
influence of Corfield on the Fourteenth Amendment’s framers). 
78 See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 57-69 (2d ed. 1997); 
WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL 
PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 7-8 (1998); Philip A. Hamburger, Privileges 
or Immunities, 105 NW. U. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1557870;  Harrison, supra note 77, at 1416-20; Kurt T. 
Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part II: John 
Bingham’s Epiphany, ___ GEO. L.J. ___ (forthcoming 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1561183; Thomas B. McAffee, Inalienable Rights, 
Legal Enforceability, and American Constitutions: The Fourteenth Amendment 
and the Concept of Unenumerated Rights, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 747, 771-
92 (2001); Timothy Sandefur, Privileges, Immunities, and Substantive Due 
Process, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIB. 115 (2010). 
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More important even than the effect on the unenumerated 
rights debate would be the significance of a Privilege or 
Immunities Clause ruling for the conversation about interpretative 
method.  Finally that discussion would be freed from so much of 
the baggage that Bork brought to it, with his talk of constitutional 
inkblots and his recalcitrant opposition to even the possibility of a 
reservoir of rights beyond the first eight amendments.79  And the 
application of those amendments to state and local governments, 
which after all is where modern constitutional law works its 
greatest practical significance, might be compelled by an 
originalist methodology, rather than as the McDonald suggests, a 
grudging concession of originalist principles for the sake of 
stability.  Far from undermining the application of (most of) the 
Bill of Rights to the states, a privileges or immunities ruling in 
McDonald may have placed the practice on a firmer foundation, 
while as the same time making less radical the consequences of 
adopting the interpretative method Scalia professes to embrace.80  
To be sure, were the Privileges or Immunities deemed an 
equality provision, as some have forcefully argued,81 then the 
Court’s protection of substantive rights -- whether enumerated in 
the Bill of Rights or found nowhere in the Constitution -- from 
state intrusion would be set on a collision course with 
originalism.82  Accordingly, one possible consequence of a 
privileges-or- immunities-based jurisprudence would be that 
originalist Justices would have to choose between substantive and 
equality interpretations of that provision -- between, on the one 
hand, a jurisprudence including both incorporation and 
unenumerated rights or, on the other hand, a modern case law 
                                                 
79 See supra note 43. 
80 Because the Fourteenth Amendment protects the privileges and immunities of 
U.S. “citizens” and extends due process to all “persons,” an issue, well beyond 
the scope of this essay, would then arise under the Amendment as to which 
federal rights ought not to belong to non-citizens.  U.S. Const. am. 14, § 1.    
81 See, e.g., Harrison, supra note 77, at 1422; Hamburger, supra note 78. 
82 Cf. Lawrence Rosenthal, The New Originalism and Incorporation, 
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1358473 (last visited Aug. 22, 2010) (arguing 
that the “original public meaning” case for incorporation is problematic).  
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having neither.  A desire to avoid such a stark choice would give 
Justice Scalia yet another reason, more pragmatic than principled, 
to prefer a muddled due-process compromise to the privileges or 
immunities inquiry originalism would seem to require.  But he 
avoids this inquiry only at the cost of “dilut[ing] originalism and 
mak[ing] it a nakedly discretionary practice.”83        
 
III. WHAT DIFFERENCE WILL MCDONALD MAKE? 
 
 Since McDonald was really about the Court’s 
unenumerated rights rulings, the decision invites speculation about 
what effect it will likely have on them, both in the near and more 
distant future. 
 In the short run, McDonald signals a return to the 
Washington v. Glucksberg84 settlement, according to which the 
Rehnquist Court purportedly committed itself to applying a 
grudging and restrictive methodology for identifying new 
unenumerated fundamental rights.  Scalia’s atypical silence in 
Glucksberg represented his declaration of victory in his long 
struggle to halt the advance of substantive due process; there was 
no need for him to write separately (and abundant reason not to do 
so) when the Chief Justice’s opinion for the Court pledged it to an 
approach to discovering new unenumerated in terms close to those 
Scalia himself had used (albeit never for majority of the Justices).85  
The practical consequence of this settlement is that the Court will 
honor its precedents and protect the unenumerated rights it has 
previously found to be entitled to some form of enhanced judicial 
scrutiny, but that it will almost invariably decline invitations to 
name new rights, even when presented with claims highly 
                                                 
83 Reva B. Siegel, Heller and Originalism’s Dead Hand: In Theory and 
Practice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1399, 1409 (2009). 
84 521 U.S. 707 (1997). 
85 For a discussion of Justice Scalia’s proposed substantive due process 
methodology, see supra notes 57 - 59 and accompanying text. 
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analogous to those it had in the past embraced.86  To choose but 
one example, McDonald makes it less likely that the Court will 
recognize a right to potentially lethal palliative care, even though 
five Justices arguably held open that possibility87 in Glucksberg 
itself.88  
 In the longer term, however, it is far from clear that even 
the rights the Court has previously recognized will continue to 
enjoy the Court’s solicitude.  It is no secret that not only our 
constitutional but indeed our political culture has for more than 
three decades labored under the weight of a deep and passionate 
divide on the issue of abortion.  When then-nominee John Roberts 
came before the Senate Judiciary Committee, the candidate and his 
inquisitors spoke of this matter in code, substituting for Roe the 
                                                 
86 See John O. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville’s America: The Rehnquist 
Court’s Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REV. 485, 568 (2002) 
(asserting that Glucksberg was notable “not only because the Court unanimously 
declined to announce a constitutional right to assisted suicide, but because the 
majority opinion offered an analysis of fundamental rights that suggested that 
there would be few such announcements in the future”).  
87 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 736-37 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stressing that 
“[t]he parties and amici agree that in these States a patient who is suffering from 
a terminal illness and who is experiencing great pain has no legal barriers to 
obtaining medication, from qualified physicians, to alleviate that suffering, even 
to the point of causing unconsciousness and hastening death”).  Justices 
Ginsburg and Breyer joined Justice O’Connor’s opinion.  Id. at 736.  See also id. 
at 750 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (declining to “foreclose the 
possibility that an individual plaintiff seeking to hasten her death, or a doctor 
whose assistance was sought, could prevail in a more particularized challenge”); 
id. at 780 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasizing that “[t]he State 
. . . generally permits physicians to administer medication to patients in terminal 
conditions when the primary intent is to alleviate pain, even when the 
medication is so powerful as to hasten death and the patient chooses to receive it 
with that understanding”).  See also David Orentlicher, The Supreme Court and 
Terminal Sedation: Rejecting Assisted Suicide, Embracing Euthanasia, 24 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 947, 951-54 (1997) (discussing O’Connor and Breyer 
opinions’ treatment of palliative care issues). 
88 Additional examples are supplied by the numerous contentious claims 
considered in the lower federal courts and assiduously avoided by the Supreme 
Court.  See supra notes 52-55, and accompanying text. 
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concept of the “superprecedent.”89  The idea was that some rulings, 
no matter how wrong, might become so embedded into our 
fundamental law, most obviously by the Court’s repeated 
reaffirmation of their substance, that any further reconsideration 
would be ill advised, even reckless.90  Roberts dutifully promised 
that he believed in such precedents and pledged to honor them 
were he confirmed.91  When Roberts joined the Court as its 
sixteenth Chief Justice, five other members were on record in 
support of Roe’s “fundamental holding,” and nothing in the 
meantime affords any reason to suspect that this has changed.  But 
it might.  The three out of those five Justices who remain on the 
Court are now in their seventies,92 and one has struggled against 
cancer.93  Should any one of those Justices’ seats become vacant 
during a Republican administration, the Chief Justice might be 
tested as to whether Roe (as modified in Casey) really deserved 
super-precedential status.94  And of course whither Roe other 
unenumerated rights precedents95 might follow.  To be sure, 
McDonald in no way commits the Roberts Court to pursuit of such 
an unenumerated rights rollback, but it assiduously avoided adding 
an obstacle to that path. 
 Finally, McDonald makes it significantly less likely that the 
Justices will, anytime within a judicial life now in being, make 
substantial progress towards putting their interpretative house in 
                                                 
89 Jeffrey Rosen, So, Do You Believe in “Superprecedent”? N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
30, 2005, at 41. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 See Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited Aug. 9, 
2010). 
93 See Ailing Justice Returns to Court, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2009, at A13. 
94 There is perhaps less reason to wonder where Justice Alito stands on the 
matter.  Shortly after the announcement of his nomination, his mother said of 
her son, a Catholic, “of course he [was] against abortion.”  Court’s New Order: 
Bush Picks Samuel Alito for Supreme Court Spot, CHI. TRIB., November 1, 
2005, at 3.  
95 See supra notes 38 - 51 and accompanying text. 
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order.  Much of the Court’s modern case law concerning individual 
rights, including both those enumerated in the Bill of Rights and 
those lacking such a textual hook, at least appears to be willful 
invention from an originalist perspective.96  As noted above, the 
precedents’ claim that substantial portions of the First, Fourth, 
Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments are implicit in the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause confronts unanswerable textual 
objections.97  Of course, even more fundamentally the existence of 
a written Constitution arguably undercuts the case for an unwritten 
one.98  This rupture between the jurisprudence and the 
Constitution’s text emits its own penumbras and emanations, 
which eventually lead to the startling, but descriptively compelling, 
claim that the Constitution’s text has become irrelevant to the 
project of modern constitutional law.99 
 Such a verdict should be more than a little troubling, given 
that the justification for judicial review is that treating a written 
constitution as fundamental law requires no less.100  Had the Court 
taken the occasion of McDonald to shift the focus from the Due 
Process to the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the effort to square the U.S. reports with the words if 
not also the history of the Constitution would have been made that 
much easier.  The Court’s failure to do so supplies dispiriting 
evidence that such matters as intellectual consistency and 
coherence count for little in the minds of most sitting Justices. 
                                                 
96 See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 78, at 413; see also supra note 64. 
97 See supra notes 70 - 71 and accompanying text. 
98 See generally THOMAS B. MCAFFEE, INHERENT RIGHTS, THE WRITTEN 
CONSTITUTION, AND POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY: THE FOUNDERS’ UNDERSTANDING 
173 (2000) (“A rights foundationalist theory of the Constitution . . . carries the 
potential to privilege judicial views of natural law or political morality over the 
views of the people who are the source of judicial office.”). 
99 See Philip B. Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The Religion 
Clauses of the First Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 VILL. L. REV. 3 
(1979);  David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 
HARV. L. REV. 1457 (2001). 
100 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).  See generally 





 To the casual observer, the mainstream media, pundits, 
most monitoring lawyers, and even the dissenting Justices, 
McDonald was a gun-rights case.  But Heller had so foreshadowed 
the ultimate verdict on the Second Amendment’s application to the 
states as to all but foreclose credible contrary argument.  The real 
significance of the decision lies in what it says about the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of the privileges or 
immunities of citizens, whether and if so to what extent that clause 
accords protection to individual rights, including rights not 
enumerated in the Bill of Rights, and the rigor with which a 
majority of the Justices are willing to treat the text of the 
Constitution.  Sadly, McDonald teaches that citizens’ privileges 
and immunities, whatever they may be, will linger in obscurity and 
forecasts that future debate about such issues as parental rights and 
reproductive freedom will be conducted on the basis of false 
premises and with arguments designed more to obfuscate than to 
enlighten.  What all this in turn means for the present state of 
judicial fidelity to the Constitution is no cause for celebration.   
